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Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in
Capital Sentencing
Almost every criminal defendant who is found guilty can find
some mistake in the proceedings leading to his conviction. Because
reversal for all such errors would be too costly and would under-
mine public confidence in the criminal justice system, courts and
legislatures have developed "harmless error" rules that uphold a
decision tainted by error if the error is found not to have affected
the outcome at trial. The rules, contained in both common law and
statutes, reach even those errors that affect the constitutional
rights of the defendant. Although many commentators have criti-
cized these rules,1 both federal and state appellate courts use them
consistently.
Many courts have used a harmless error test to affirm even
capital sentences, arguing that defendants facing the death penalty
have no more right to an error-free proceeding than do other de-
fendants. However, application of the harmless error doctrine is in-
appropriate in a capital case where error is found in the sentencing
phase rather than in the trial of guilt. The primary difference be-
tween capital sentencing and noncapital sentencing is that
sentencers in capital cases have vast discretion to hear any mitigat-
ing evidence available to the defense and to impose a life sentence
despite compelling aggravating circumstances. In the face of such
sentencing discretion, an appellate court cannot meaningfully con-
clude that an error had no impact on the jury's sentence. The re-
viewing court is disabled from assessing the impact of both consti-
tutional and nonconstitutional errors alike in the context of capital
sentencing. This comment therefore concludes that the harmless
error doctrine never should be used to affirm the outcome of flawed
capital sentencing proceedings.
Part I of this comment outlines the development of harmless
error rules, including the policy underlying their use and their ap-
plication in capital sentencing. Part II delves deeper into the
1 See, e.g., Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 421, 421 (1980) (" 'Harmless constitutional error' is among the most
insidious of legal doctrines."); Note, Harmful Use of Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64
Cornell L. Rev. 538, 565 (1979).
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unique aspects of capital sentencing that compel restrictions on
the rule; it concludes that both the practical and substantive dif-
ferences between capital sentencing and other criminal proceedings
preclude the use of the harmless error test to assess the impact of
errors in capital punishment hearings.
I. THE HARMLESS ERROR TEST:
DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION IN CAPITAL SENTENCING
A. Background
The harmless error test, used often by appellate courts,2 was
at first a narrow exception to a per se rule. The test responded to
the traditional common law rule that required automatic reversal
when error in trial proceedings was proven, even if the error had
not affected the outcome of the case.' Automatic reversal was
widely condemned as a waste of judicial resources. Courts were la-
beled "impregnable citadels of technicality ' 4 because they reflex-
ively reversed sound decisions infected with minor procedural mis-
takes, often compelling expensive retrials where the outcome
almost always duplicated the original result.5 However, critics were
not only concerned with judicial economy; they were also worried
that a rule requiring reversal of convictions on the ground of tech-
nical errors would undermine public respect for the judicial sys-
tem.6 Moreover, the concern that the appellate court's determina-
tion of harmlessness would usurp the jury's function was
counterbalanced by the notion that reversing fundamentally sound
jury verdicts also, and perhaps more fundamentally, usurped this
See United States v. Lane, 106 S.Ct. 725, 744 (1986) (Stevens, dissenting) (noting
increased use of harmless error tests).
Although the rule in Crease v. Barrett, 149 Eng.Rep. 1353, 1359 (Exch. 1835), seemed
to allow for a limited harmless error approach, English and American courts adopted an
absolute reversal approach. See Roger Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 8, 11-13
(1970). See also John Henry Wigmore, 1 Wigmore on Evidence § 21 at 364 (3d ed. 1940);
Goldberg, 71 J. Crim. L. & Criminology at 422 (cited in note 1); Note, Harmless Error: The
Need for a Uniform Standard, 53 St. John's L. Rev. 541, 543-45 (1979).
4 Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by Exer-
cise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A. J. 217-22 (1925), quoted in Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 750, 759 (1946). See Traynor, Harmless Error at 14-15 (cited in note 3) ("There
had to be an end to battles of bright or dull wits in the courtroom on witless
technicalities.").
6 See Lane, 106 S.Ct. at 743 (Stevens, dissenting); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S.
499, 509 (1983); 1 Wigmore on Evidence § 21 at 370-73 (cited in note 3).
1 See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436-37 (1986) (harmless error doctrine
"promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of
the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error"); Traynor,
Harmless Error at 14, 35 (cited in note 3).
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role.7
Pressures for reform led to statutory and common law rules
for harmless error. The first federal statutory harmless error rule
only applied when "technical" errors were found; if an error af-
fected the substantive rights of the parties, the case would be re-
versed." Later, Congress expanded the federal statute to reach all
nonconstitutional errors, including nontechnical ones. But the test
for reversal continued to be whether the error affected the "sub-
stantial" rights of the parties.' The Supreme Court ruled that this
test was satisfied only when the error affected the trial's outcome.10
Thus, a two-step test determines whether a criminal convic-
tion must be reversed for nonconstitutional error. The party claim-
ing the error must persuade the reviewing court first that there was
an error in the proceeding, and second that the error affected the
outcome of the trial." By examining the error itself-or, in the
case of an evidentiary error, the totality of the case presented to
the jury-the court decides whether the error was harmless.12
In Chapman v. California, the Supreme Court approved the
application of the harmless error test to constitutional errors in
criminal trials.'3 The Court recognized the utility of harmless error
rules that "block setting aside convictions for small errors or de-
fects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result
7 1 Wigmore on Evidence § 21 at 370 (cited in note 3) ("The 'usurpation' [of the jury's
role], if any, consists in setting aside the verdict, not in confirming it.").
8 28 U.S.C. § 391 (1946).
9 See, for example, 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(a).
10 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 760-65 ("[The statute] 'affects only technical errors.'... But
if one cannot say, with fair assurance.., that the judgment was not substantially swayed
by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected.").
The test that considers whether the error affected the reliability of the result applies
only to errors that alter the presentation of the evidence to the jury. The effect of structural
error-errors that involve, for instance, venue and pleadings--can be determined indepen-
dently of the evidence presented to the accused. Thus the test for these errors looks at the
error itself-without any focus on its impact on the decision maker-to determine whether
it deprived the defendant of the substantive right the structural rule was intended to pro-
tect. This strand of the harmless error test, however, does not usurp jury decision making or
throw into question the determination of guilt, and it is not controversial. Wayne R. Lafave
and Jerold Israel, 3 Criminal Procedure § 26.6(a) at 259-60 (1984). This comment deals with
evidentiary errors in capital sentencing and does not extend to structural errors.
" Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764 ("[T]he question is, not were [the fact-finders] right in
their judgment, regardless of the error or its effect upon the verdict. It is rather what effect
the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision. The critical
thing is the impact of the thing done wrong on the minds of other men, not on one's own, in
the total setting."). See also Lane, 106 S.Ct. at 732.
12 See, e.g., Lane, 106 S.Ct. at 732 (joinder violation harmless because overwhelming
evidence available regarding guilt).
13 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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of the trial." The Court held that constitutional errors that are
"unimportant or insignificant" in a trial can be deemed harmless,
just as nonconstitutional errors can; only those errors that affect
the substantial rights of the parties require reversal.14
The Chapman test, like the nonconstitutional standard, deter-
mines whether the error affected the substantive rights of the par-
ties by looking at the effect of the error on the trial's outcome.15
Relying on its earlier decision in Fahy v. Connecticut,16 the Court
in Chapman said the "question is whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed
to the conviction. ' 17 Under Chapman, then, the reviewing court
must decide first whether constitutional error occurred and then
whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error affected the out-
come of the trial. For example, even if the jury heard evidence that
was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment's prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures, the reviewing court will sus-
tain the conviction if the evidence did not contribute to the trial
outcome.1 8
14 Id. at 22, 23. Before Chapman, the Court had suggested that the harmless error doc-
trine might be inappropriate where the errors were of constitutional magnitude. See Kot-
teakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65 ("If, when all is said and done, the conviction [sic] is sure that the
error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment
should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm or a spe-
cific command of Congress.") (emphasis added); Lane, 106 S.Ct. at 738 (Brennan, concur-
ring). Even after Chapman, however, it is not clear to what extent Congress could affect the
constitutional rule by legislation. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21; Traynor, Harmless Error at
41 (cited in note 3).
15 386 U.S. at 23.
16 375 U.S. 85 (1963) (reversing conviction, holding that it was not harmless error for
trial judge to admit evidence obtained from illegal search and seizure where the evidence
was prejudicial to the defendant).
17 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23, citing Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86-87.
Is See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560
(1971) (harmless error test applies to violations of the fourth amendment).
The second phase of the Chapman test takes one of two forms: the so-called "affect"
test or the "overwhelming evidence" test. For a general discussion, see Martha A. Field,
Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of a Ra-
tionale, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 15, 16-36 (1976).
Under the "affect" test, the reviewing court focuses on the erroneously admitted evi-
dence and asks whether it affected the outcome of the trial. This approach finds support in
Chapman itself. See 386 U.S. at 23. See also Comment, Connecticut v. Johnson: Will the
Use of the Sandstrom Instruction Trigger the Automatic Reversal Rule?, 19 New Eng. L.
Rev. 487, 494-95 (1984). This is an effective way to test for harmlessness because in many
cases the reviewing court is able to determine that an error did not contribute to the trial
outcome, independent of the other evidence presented to the jury. See Traynor, Harmless
Error at 36 (cited in note 3).
The "overwhelming evidence" test, on the other hand, looks to the evidence properly
admitted to determine whether the jury would have reached a similar result had the tainted
The University of Chicago Law Review [54:740
However, in several important ways the test for harmlessness
of constitutional errors differs from that for nonconstitutional er-
rors. First, once a constitutional error is found, the burden shifts to
the state to prove its harmlessness; the burden does not shift for
nonconstitutional errors.19 Second, the reviewing court must be
persuaded "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the error did not af-
fect the trial outcome in order to deem the error "harmless"-a
stricter standard of persuasion than that for nonconstitutional er-
ror.2 0 And most importantly, some constitutional errors never can
be deemed harmless, whereas any nonconstitutional error may be
considered harmless in a particular case.21 In Chapman itself, both
the plurality and the dissent stated that certain constitutional er-
rors are never harmless.22
Both the constitutional and the nonconstitutional harmless er-
ror tests reflect a balancing of the defendant's interests in an error-
free proceeding against the societal interest in finality and judicial
economy. This balancing is at the heart of the harmless error doc-
trine.2 The differences between the tests reflect the Court's view
evidence not been admitted. While it finds support in Supreme Court decisions-for exam-
ple, Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1972)-it has faced heated criticism from
commentators, since it asks, in effect, whether the same decision would be upheld by a new
jury on retrial. Such an outcome, the commentators argue, is unpredictable, given the uncer-
tainties of trial tactics, judicial rulings, and jury responses. Field, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 21-22
(cited in this note); Note, 53 St. John's L. Rev. at 550 (cited in note 3).
In practice, both of these tests indicate courts' willingness to compare the illegally ad-
mitted evidence with the evidence properly admitted to assess the harmfulness of the error.
Even under the strict "affect" approach, under which the court formally should look only to
the particular item to determine its importance in the trial, the error can be deemed harm-
less if there was overwhelming evidence in front of the jury. Overwhelming evidence against
the defendant would suggest that the jury did not use the erroneously admitted evidence in
finding the defendant guilty or in sentencing him.
19 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 ("Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting
highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person prejudiced
by it a burden to show that it was harmless.").
10 See Lane, 106 S.Ct. at 730 n.9 (noting that the Chapman standard is "considerably
more onerous than the standard for non-constitutional errors"). See also Traynor, Harmless
Error at 44 (cited in note 3) (arguing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a "belief
approaching certainty").
2' Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65. In addition, the nonconstitutional harmless error test
is applied both to evidentiary and to structural errors. By contrast, the constitutional harm-
less error rule is applied only to those errors that implicate the jury's decision; so-called
structural errors result in automatic reversal.
22 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8, citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced
confession); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (denial of right to counsel); Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (biased judge).
2s See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 502 (1983) (criticizing the lower court for
its failure "to strike the balance between disciplining the prosecutor on the one hand, and
the interest in the prompt administration of justice and the interests of the victims on the
Harmless Error and Death Penalty
that a defendant's interests in a proceeding free of constitutional
error are of a different magnitude than her interest in a proceeding
free of any error whatsoever, even if the likely effect on the out-
come is no different as between constitutional and nonconstitu-
tional errors. 24
In particular, some constitutional errors require automatic re-
versal, whereas no nonconstitutional mistakes require similar treat-
ment. Nonconstitutional error does not in itself violate the defend-
ant's constitutional rights unless the error so influenced the jury's
decision that impinged upon the right to a fair trial. Thus, reversal
for nonconstitutional error is necessary only when the error af-
fected the outcome. But constitutional error in itself violates a con-
stitutional norm, without reference to the impact of the error on
the fact finder. This distinction may underlie the Court's willing-
ness to find that some constitutional errors require automatic
reversal.
The constitutional errors that require automatic reversal are
of two kinds: (1) errors that are so fundamental to the constitu-
tional right to a fair trial that they independently require reversal;
and (2) errors that inherently make application of the outcome-
determinative test impossible. 5
The first group of errors that demand automatic reversal com-
prises those that "necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair"
and undermine basic protections necessary for the fair determina-
tion of guilt or innocence.2 6 These errors include adjudication by a
biased judge and complete denial of the right to counsel.27 They
may also include those errors that do not directly implicate the
defendant's interest in a fair trial, but instead affect interests ex-
traneous to the trial process. One example is a violation of the
double jeopardy clause, which, while not itself infringing the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial, nonetheless requires automatic rever-
sal to protect other interests of the defendant. 8
The second group of errors that require automatic reversal are
other"). Indeed, interests in judicial economy and public respect triggered the adoption of
harmless error rules.
2, See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 Va. L. Rev. 988, 1024-25
(1973); Note, 64 Cornell L. Rev. at 550-51 (cited in note 1).
25 See Van Arsdall, 106 S.Ct. at 1437; Lane, 106 S.Ct. at 745 (Stevens, dissenting);
LaFave and Israel, 3 Criminal Procedure § 26.6(d) at 272-77 (cited in note 10).
16 See Rose v. Clark, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3106 (1986) (collecting cases).
17 Tumey, 273 U.S. 510; Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
28 Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1970). See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 52 n.7
(Harlan, dissenting), 42-43 (Stewart, concurring). See also Lafave and Israel, 3 Criminal
Procedure § 26.6(d) at 273-74 (cited in note 10).
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those with indeterminate effects on the trial. In these cases-such
as improperly obtained confessions29 or unconstitutional presump-
tions 30 -the effect of the error is so pervasive or uncertain that the
reviewing court is unable to decide whether or not the error was
harmless.
The errors for which automatic reversal is not required are
those most susceptible to the Chapman test: errors (mainly evi-
dentiary ones3 l) whose effect on the outcome can be measured by
comparing them against an objective evidentiary standard. Under
Chapman, all those errors that do not implicate fundamental in-
terests of the defendant independent of the evidence presented or
do not have an inherently indeterminate impact, may be deemed
"harmless. 3 2 But even when other errors are challenged, the pred-
icate for harmless error review still is the reviewing court's ability
to discover the impact of the error on the decision maker below.
According to the Court, the question is, "[W]hat is to be done
about a trial error that, in theory, may have altered the basis on
which the jury decided the case, but in practice had no effect on
the outcome? '33
B. Application of the Chapman Rule in Capital Sentencing
1. Lower court cases. Some appellate courts recognize that
application of the harmless error test to capital sentencing pro-
ceedings is difficult. Since capital sentencers have broad discretion,
some courts refuse to embark on a procedure that requires a pre-
diction of the error's impact on the sentencer's decision-making
process. Because the sentencer may consider any evidence in miti-
gation of the death penalty and even may refuse to recommend
death in the face of strong aggravating circumstances, these courts
doubt their ability to determine the impact of the error on the sen-
tencer -34 Other courts hold that since the sentencer may balance
19 See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 52 n.7 (Harlan, dissenting), citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560 (1958).
30 Id. at 43-44 (Stewart, concurring). See also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-
91 (1978).
31 See Lafave & Israel, 3 Criminal Procedure § 26.6(d) at 276 (cited in note 10) ("the
Chapman harmless error rule has been applied by the Supreme Court to a wide range of
constitutional evidentiary related errors").
32 See Rose, 106 S.Ct. at 3106 (errors that per se require remand "are the exception
and not the rule").
33 Rose, 106 S.Ct. at 3108 n.11.
See Ritter v. Smith, 726 F.2d 1505, 1518-19 (11th Cir. 1984); State v. David, 425
So.2d 1241, 1250 (La. 1983); King v. State, 657 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
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the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in whatever way it
chooses, errors in admitting evidence so infect the entire sentenc-
ing process as to require a reversal of the decision.3 5 Still others
say that even if an assessment of the error's impact were possible,
the cost of a mistake in death cases is too high to risk affirming the
decision.36
Many courts, however, use the harmless error test in capital
cases just as in noncapital cases. Even if the constitutional error
tainted the evidence presented to the sentencer, some courts nev-
ertheless find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. These
courts try to expunge the evidence from the sentencing calculus
after trial and to determine-independently and on the basis of a
cold record-what the outcome would have been without the
tainted information.
For example, in State v. Rushing, a Louisiana court affirmed a
death sentence resulting from a sentencing hearing in which a lay
witness improperly opined that the murder was committed in a
particularly cruel, heinous, and atrocious manner.3 7 This is a con-
stitutional defect because the opinion usurps the role of the jury.
But even though the damaging statement was especially compel-
ling because it was made by a police detective, who stated it was
one of the most vicious attacks he had ever seen, the court ruled
that "the jury could have determined from the other [untainted]
evidence that the murder was committed in a cruel, atrocious or
heinous manner. . . . Any error in the admission of the lay wit-
ness opinion was harmless and did not influence the jury in re-
turning the death sentence." 8
In other death sentencing cases, courts have undertaken simi-
lar analyses. In many, courts have determined that the tainted evi-
dence, though actually presented to the sentencer, was nonetheless
35 People v. Brown, 40 Cal.3d 512, 536-37, 220 Cal.Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440, 452-53
(1985); People v. Frank, 38 Cal.3d 711, 735, 214 Cal.Rptr. 801, 700 P.2d 415, 428 (1985)
(error in admitting notebooks at penalty phase "infected the entire proceeding on this ques-
tion, and was therefore prejudicial under any test"); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713, 724
(Miss. 1984) (admitting incriminating statement received in violation of sixth amendment in
sentencing phase not harmless, because it "so infected the sentencing phase that reversal of
that phase must be ordered").
11 State v. Smith, 136 Ariz. 273, 280, 665 P.2d 995, 1002 (1983); People v. Brisbon, 106
Ill.2d 342, 371-72, 478 N.E.2d 402, 415-16 (1985); Miracle v. Commonwealth, 646 S.W.2d
720, 721 (Ky. 1983); Johnson v. State, 439 A.2d 542, 562 (Md. 1982); King, 657 S.W.2d at
112.
,. 464 So.2d 268, 275 (La. 1985).
3$ Id. See also Jones v. State, 660 P.2d 634, 643 (Ok. Crim. App. 1983) (error in admit-
ting letter not accompanied by testimony of person with knowledge of contents deemed
harmless, since other evidence supporting claim was admitted).
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harmless since it was cumulative of other evidence properly before
the jury.39 Similarly, when trial courts have blocked mitigating evi-
dence from the proceedings, reviewing courts have nonetheless af-
firmed if the evidence was cumulative.40 Finally, other courts have
affirmed sentences after looking at the tainted evidence and deter-
mining that it was so irrelevant as not to affect the sentencer's
deliberations.4'
2. Supreme Court cases. In the past, lower courts probably
varied in applying the harmless error test in capital punishment
cases at least partially because the Supreme Court offered them
little guidance. In Skipper v. South Carolina, the Court applied
the Chapman test in a capital case's sentencing phase.42 Applying
the test, the Court found the error not harmless; the justices, how-
ever, failed to discuss whether harmless error analysis should be
applied to death sentencing, given the purposes underlying the
Chapman test and the unique concerns associated with death
sentencing.
Skipper does not settle the issue posed by this comment. Had
the Court found the error harmless, it might have reconsidered its
initial decision to apply the harmless error test. The Court did not
analyze explicitly the appropriateness of the test's application. In
fact, this silent adoption of the test seems odd at first glance, given
the heated disagreement among lower courts on the issue and the
equally heated discussions in the Supreme Court's prior harmless
error cases.
43
However, the Skipper Court's application of the test can be
seen as the culmination of a recent line of cases that express dis-
satisfaction with automatic reversal rules in general. This trend
can be seen most clearly in the progression from Connecticut v.
Johnson44 to Rose v. Clark.45 In Johnson, the Court held unconsti-
tutional an instruction that the jury in the guilt phase of a capital
case could infer that the defendant had intended the natural con-
39 See, e.g., Banks v. State, 701 P.2d 418, 425-26 (Ok. Crim. App. 1985) (error in admit-
ting evidence of previous conviction harmless since evidence of two other previous convic-
tions were validly admitted).
'o State v. Patterson, 327 S.E.2d 650, 653-54 (S.C. 1984).
' See Turner v. State, 685 S.W.2d 38, 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ("irrelevant" inad-
missible evidence did not affect the sentencer's decision).
42 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1672-73 (1986).
43 See, for example, Rose, 106 S.Ct. at 3113-16 (Blackmun, dissenting); Connecticut v.
Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 90-102 (1983) (Powell, dissenting).
44 460 U.S. 73 (1983).
45 106 S.Ct. 3101 (1986).
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sequences of his acts. 6 More importantly, the plurality opinion in-
dicated serious doubt that such an error could ever be deemed
harmless, stating that the reviewing court could not predict the ac-
tual effect of the instruction on the jury's considerations. 7
However, Rose, decided just three years later, strongly rejected
the Johnson plurality's concerns. In Rose, the Court acknowledged
that the jury instruction was unconstitutional; however, without
referring to the concerns expressed in Johnson, the Court held
that the Chapman test should apply to this kind of error. 8 Over
vigorous dissent, the Court stated that absolute remand is "the ex-
ception and not the rule.' 49 Skipper is just one more step along
this line, revealing the Court's determination to apply harmless er-
ror analysis in almost all contexts.5 0 As Skipper illustrates, the
Court has never distinguished capital sentencing from other types
of cases when deciding whether to apply harmless error rules; the
clear trend of the cases is against drawing such a distinction.
Nonetheless, the capital sentencing context is different, and its pe-
culiarities mandate automatic reversal for error in these cases.
II. AUTOMATIC REVERSAL FOR ERRORS IN
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SENTENCING
The impact of a constitutional error after Chapman must be
assessed in the context of the proceeding in which the error oc-
curred.51 Death sentencing hearings differ from ordinary trials:
unique procedures and policies have been developed to take into
account the severity and finality of the contemplated punishment.
These procedures make it impossible for reviewing courts to make
the determination central to harmless error analysis: that is, to de-
termine with reasonable certainty that an error in the sentencing
hearing had no effect on the sentencer's deliberations. Thus, when
error-whether constitutional or not-is found in the sentencing
46 460 U.S. at 86-88 (plurality). The instruction violated Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510 (1979).
47 460 U.S. at 87-88 (plurality). This problem is similar to that of discerning the effect
of errors on the sentencer in capital cases.
48 Rose, 106 S.Ct. at 3107-09.
41 Id. at 3106.
"0 See also Pope v. Illinois, 55 U.S.L.W. 4595 (May 4, 1987) (remanding for application
of harmless error test to improper jury instruction in obscenity case); Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (applying harmless error analysis to a sixth amendment claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel).
81 Kotteakos states that the "character of the proceeding, what is at stake upon its
outcome," must be taken into account in determining harmlessness. 328 U.S. at 762.
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phase of a capital case, the sentence must be reversed.
A. The Unique Aspects of Capital Sentencing
Since its landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia,5 2 the Su-
preme Court has emphasized the uniqueness of death as a criminal
punishment. Death is "an unusually severe punishment, unusual in
its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity. '53 It differs from lesser
sentences "not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrev-
ocability. '54 Because of the death sentence's gravity, the Court has
concluded that it may not be imposed unless certain procedural
requirements have been met and unless the sentencer has been
given the opportunity to dispense mercy if it so desires.
1. Procedural regularity. It is critically important to ensure
that capital punishment is imposed without arbitrariness or ca-
price. The sentence must be as reliable 55 and fair" as procedures
can make them. The defendant and society must be assured that
death is the appropriate punishment in the specific case,57 particu-
larly since its imposition often has seemed like "little more than a
lottery system, '58 and its burden historically has fallen "upon the
poor, the ignorant, and the underprivileged members of society." e
Thus "it is of vital importance to the defendant and to the com-
munity that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and ap-
pear to be, based on reason rather than caprice and emotion." 60 A
system of procedural regularity helps to ensure the achievement of
these twin goals of fairness and reliability. 1
62 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 287 (Brennan, concurring).
Id. at 306 (Stewart, concurring).
See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality) ("We are satisfied that this
qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliabil-
ity when the death sentence is imposed."). See also Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,
330 (1985); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 959 (1983) (Stevens, concurring); Furman, 408
U.S. at 310 (Stewart, concurring).
06 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111 (1982) (beginning with Furman, the
Court has attempted to provide constitutional standards for death penalty that would serve
"both goals of measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused."). See also
Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252-53 (1976) (plurality).
7 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
"Furman, 408 U.S. at 293 (Brennan, concurring).
59 Id. at 365-66 (Marshall, concurring). See also id. at 255-56 (Douglas, concurring), 274
(Brennan, concurring).
60 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). See also Eddings, 455 U.S. at 117-18
(O'Connor, concurring); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642-43 (1980).
0' See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 704-05 (Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 117-18 (O'Connor, concurring).
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The Supreme Court has translated the concern for procedural
regularity into requirements that the sentencer's discretion in im-
posing the punishment be "channelled" and that the sentence be
reviewed by appellate courts to avoid arbitrary or unfair applica-
tion of the death penalty. 2 By "channelling," the Court means
that states must adopt statutes that distinguish between those de-
fendants who deserve capital punishment and those who do not,"3
and that guide juries as to those factors required to support the
death penalty.8 4 Jurors must affirmatively find such factors before
they may impose a sentence of death. 5 Without such safeguards,
there is an impermissible danger that death would be imposed "de-
pendent on the whim of one man or [twelve]. 66
The Court has also required meaningful appellate review in
death penalty cases. There must be a way "for the judiciary to
check arbitrary and capricious exercise of that [sentencing] power
through a review of death sentences. ' 67 Thus appellate courts must
review the sentence for error6 and ensure that it was not imposed
" Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982), and cases cited therein. See also Califor-
nia v. Brown, 107 S.Ct. 837, 839 (1987).
63 For instance, the Court has criticized a Georgia death sentence based solely on a
finding that the offense was "'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman."' God-
frey, 446 U.S. at 428-29. Almost any murder could be so deemed, and thus this description
of an aggravating circumstance gives the jury little guidance in determining which defend-
ants deserve the death penalty.
See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192 (1976) (plurality)
(jury should be given guidance "regarding the factors about the crime and the defendant
that the State, representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing
decision"); Brown, 107 S.Ct. at 839.
The Court's recent decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S.Ct. 1756 (1987), seems incon-
sistent with the purposes of the channelling requirement. In McCleskey, the Court refused
to reverse a death sentence on the basis of statistical studies purporting to show that Geor-
gia's death penalty statute was unfair in application, in that the sentence was far more
likely to be imposed in cases involving a black defendant and a white victim than in any
other circumstances. Id. at 1766. The Court acknowledged this apparent disparity in appli-
cation of the statute, but stated that such disparities are "inevitable" in our criminal justice
system, id. at 1777, and held that so long as the Court's procedural requirements are met,
the sentence will be upheld. Id. at 1788.
One can argue that McCleskey is an merely an outgrowth of the Court's skepticism
regarding the use of statistics to reverse criminal convictions. See id. at 4548. On the other
hand, the case may be seen as an acknowledgement that the flip side of the sentencer's
discretion to impose mercy, is its discretion to impose death, once the threshold channelling
requirements are met.
'5 See Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 257-58 (plurality). But see Barclay, 463 U.S. at 957 (plural-
ity) ("no constitutional defect in a sentence based on both statutory and nonstatutory ag-
gravating circumstances").
6 Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, concurring).
7 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (plurality). See also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (plurality).
" Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983) ("the severity of the sentence mandates
careful scrutiny in the review of any colorable claim of error").
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out of whim or prejudice.69 Moreover, the reviewing court must de-
cide if the evidence supported the sentencer's finding of aggravat-
ing circumstances.70 Finally, in order to ensure further that the
sentence is fair, the appellate court may compare the sentence with
others given to similar defendants involved in similar circum-
stances, 71 but it is not required to do so.72 These safeguards, set
out by the Supreme Court and contained in state statutes, help to
achieve fairness and reliability.
In most cases, the trial leading to conviction and a death sen-
tence is bifurcated, with the same jury addressing the questions of
guilt and punishment in two separate proceedings.7" In sentencing
under this system, jurors generally must find explicit, statutorily
defined aggravating circumstances before recommending death, 4
but at the same time they are allowed to consider a wide variety of
evidence in mitigation.75 This is one of the purposes of the bifur-
cated system. To allow mitigating evidence in the sentencing pro-
:' Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (plurality).
0 Appellate review to ensure that the evidence supports the verdict differs from harm-
less error review. In the former, the court independently reweighs the same evidence the
sentencer considered, as a check to ensure that enough evidence supported the sentence; in
the latter, the court predicts what impact the error had on the actual sentencing delibera-
tions by considering evidence that, in its totality, was different than that presented to the
jury. See Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S.Ct. 689, 703 (1986) (Blackmun, dissenting). Nevertheless,
review of a jury's finding of aggravated circumstances must include review of the evidence to
determine if it supports the verdict, for that is the only way to -discover if the sentence was
based on whim or prejudice. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (plurality).
11 See Barclay, 463 U.S. at 958 (plurality); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258-59 (plurality);
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204-06 (plurality); Baldwin v. State, 456 So.2d 117, 126 (Ala. Crim. App.
1983).
12 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 49-52 (1984).
13 See Note, The Presumption of Life: A Starting Point for a Due Process Analysis of
Capital Sentencing, 94 Yale L. J. 351, 366 (1984) ("Bifurcation is perhaps the most distinc-
tive feature of the capital punishment statutes upheld by the Supreme Court in 1976. It is a
feature that all states with capital punishment statutes have subsequently adopted."). See
also Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 101-19 (1980) (chart of provi-
sions in state capital punishment statutes).
7' See Note, 94 Yale L. J. at 368 n.103 (cited in note 73) (majority of states require that
prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the aggravating
factors listed in the statute). See also Pulley, 465 U.S. at 53 ("By requiring the jury to find
at least one special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, the statute limits the death
sentence to a small subclass of capital-eligible cases.")
7' See Note, 94 Yale L. J. at 368 n.103 ("The defendant can present any factors in
mitigation and generally is not bound by the rules of evidence."). See also Hitchcock v.
Dugger, 107 S.Ct. 1821 (1987) (reversing sentence where jury was not allowed to consider all
evidence in mitigation); McCleskey, 107 S.Ct. at 1773 ("the Constitution limits a State's
ability to narrow a sentencer's discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to
decline to impose the death sentence") (emphasis in original).
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ceeding even if it was excluded in the trial of guilt.7 6
At the sentencing proceeding, the prosecution has the burden
of proving that the aggravating circumstances outweigh all mitigat-
ing circumstances.17 The jury recommendation either becomes the
sentence for the defendant or is considered by the trial judge who
makes the final determination.78 After the trial, all states require
reviewing courts to consider independently whether the evidence
supports the sentence; most states also require the appellate court
to check that the punishment does not differ greatly from punish-
ments meted out to similar defendants in similar circumstances. 9
2. Mitigation and mercy. The strict procedural safeguards
required in death sentencing are not the only constitutional re-
quirements unique to death sentencing. In order for the defendant
to be treated as an individual human being rather than a member
of "a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind
infliction of the penalty of death,"80 sentencers must give individ-
ual consideration to all mitigating circumstances surrounding the
defendant and his crime.81 If the sentencer is prohibited from con-
sidering any factor in mitigation of the punishment, there is a risk
that the death penalty will be imposed despite circumstances that
would call for a less severe penalty. The Supreme Court has held
that "[w]hen the choice is between life and death, that risk is un-
acceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and
76 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 191-92 (plurality).
77 While some states have written this requirement into their statutes, others have ne-
glected to do so. See Note, 94 Yale L. J. at 368-69 & n.107 (cited in note 73). The Supreme
Court has acknowledged that it is appropriate to compel the jury to determine whether the
prosecution has met its burden in the capital sentencing proceeding. Bullington, 451 U.S. at
444-45. See also Gillers, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 101-19 (cited in note 73) (chart).
78 See Note, 94 Yale L. J. at 365 n.90 (cited in note 73) (under most statutes, the sen-
tence imposed by the jury is binding, although some states follow the Florida statute, which
allows trial judges to reject jury sentences). See also Gillers, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 101-19
(cited in note 73) (chart).
70 See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 144 (all of the state statutes drafted after Furman provide
for automatic appeal of death sentences; most require proportionality review). See also
Note, 94 Yale L. J. at 373 n.129, noting that most states provide for a three-part review to
determine if (1) the sentence was imposed under influence of passion or prejudice, (2) the
evidence fails to support the finding of an aggravating circumstance, or (3) the sentence is
disproportionate to sentences in similar cases in the state.
so Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality). This is not only "enlightened policy" but is
also required by the eighth amendment. Id. at 304-05.
si Eddings, 455 U.S. at 111-12; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 (plurality); Brown, 107 S.Ct. at
839. Thus the eighth and fourteenth amendments forbid statutes, Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605
(plurality), and trial court judges, Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112-15 (plurality), from denying
sentencers the ability to consider any evidence in mitigation.
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Fourteenth Amendments. '8 2
Not only must jurors give individual consideration to all miti-
gating circumstances, but they also must have the freedom to im-
pose a lesser penalty than death if they desire. Jurors may refuse
to impose the death penalty regardless of the crime's circum-
stances.83 The sentencer's authority to dispense mercy further en-
sures that the punishment fits the individual circumstances of the
case and reflects society's interests.'"
In sum, the procedural requirements in death penalty cases all
work in favor of the defendant. The sentencer is free to consider
any factor in mitigation, in whatever way it chooses, and to impose
mercy if it so desires. But, in considering aggravating circum-
stances, the sentencer must look only to those that are defined by
statutes. The death penalty's procedural requirements thus estab-
lish an asymmetry in the sentencer's consideration of the aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors,8 5 an asymmetry that favors mitigation
and mercy, and one that must be reinforced by vigorous appellate
review. Each defendant must receive individualized consideration
and the fullest chance to escape death.
B. Inability to Perform the Chapman Test
As explained, harmless error doctrine requires reviewing
82 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality). Since it is important that sentencers consider all
evidence in mitigation, rules of evidence are relaxed in the sentencing phase. See, e.g., Green
v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 95-97 (1979) (per curiam) (reversed sentence where trial court re-
fused to admit hearsay evidence that tended to prove defendant did not commit murder);
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203-04 (plurality) ("So long as the evidence introduced and the argu-
ments made at the presentence hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to
impose restrictions."); Brisbon, 478 N.E.2d at 412 ("The only limitations upon evidence to
be admitted at the aggravation and mitigation phases of the sentencing hearing are rele-
vance and reliability; the hearing is not confined by rules of evidence in effect at the guilt
phase of the trial."). In fact, one of the purposes of the bifurcated trial is to allow evidence
to be presented in mitigation that was not allowed at the guilt phase. Eberheart v. State,
232 Ga. 247, 253, 206 S.E.2d 12, 17-18 (1974).
83 Furman, 408 U.S. at 314 (White, concurring). See also Moore v. Zant, 722 F.2d 640,
646 (11th Cir. 1983) (Georgia trial courts must explicitly instruct sentencing jury that it has
the option to recommend against death). Compare Brown, 107 S.Ct. at 839-40 (upholding
instruction that jury not reduce punishment out of mere sympathy).
" It may also actually further the goal of punishing criminals, for if mandatory
sentences were allowed, a sentencing jury might refuse to convict a defendant facing a possi-
ble death sentence, if it felt capital punishment was not warranted in that case. See Wood-
son, 428 U.S. at 293 (plurality).
8" See Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1376 n.57 (5th Cir. 1981) ("That asym-
metry is offensive, however, only if one assumes that the grant of mercy to some, based on
their particularized circumstances, somehow abridges the constitutional rights of others
whose particular circumstances do not inspire mercy.").
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courts, upon finding an error in the proceedings below, to deter-
mine what the sentencer would have done if there had been no
error. The appellate court must decide what the result of the trial
would have been if the sentencer had heard a different bundle of
evidence. This process is ill-suited to capital sentencing review.
First, where aggravating evidence has been erroneously admit-
ted, the reviewing court must decide whether or not the sentencer
would have sentenced the defendant to death without knowledge
of this evidence. This assessment is, to be sure, somewhat similar
to the determination of harmlessness in noncapital cases: both
must look to specific, statutorily defined factors.8 6 But in a capital
case, the sentencer has the freedom to decide how much impor-
tance to attach to aggravating circumstances; 1 it may decide, on
the basis of its observations at trial, that the aggravating circum-
stances are not very serious. Thus, the statutory definitions of ag-
gravating circumstances act as only a partial constraint on the de-
cision of the sentencer in a capital case: the sentencer may find
some aggravating circumstances and yet still choose not to impose
a death sentence. In noncapital cases or in the guilt phase of a
capital case, on the other hand, the tribunal's choice is constrained
as soon as it finds that the statutorily defined elements of a crime
are present.
Furthermore, where mitigating evidence has been erroneously
withheld, the reviewing court cannot determine what the outcome
would have been if the sentencer had heard this evidence. The sen-
tencer had discretion to impose mercy if it so chose. It is one thing
to say that an appeals court working from a cold record finds it
congenial to decide what a "reasonable" juror would have done in a
particular circumstance; it is quite another to say that the same
court can decide what a "merciful" juror would have done. The
decision of the sentencer-be it jury or judge5 5-ratifies "commu-
nity values"89 that a distant reviewing court can neither duplicate
nor, perhaps, understand. Since the sentencer must have discretion
86 See Poland v. Arizona, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 1754 (1986).
s7 See Harvard v. Florida, 459 U.S. 1128, 1132-33 (1983) (Marshall, dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari).
$a In Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461-62 (1984), the Court held that the death
penalty need not be imposed by a jury; a jury's refusal to impose the penalty may be over-
ridden by the trial judge where state law permits it.
'1 Even in Spaziano, where the Court said that a judge as well as a jury may impose a
sentence of death, the Court emphasized the importance of the "community's voice" in the
sentencing process. Id. at 462. See also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 528 (1968);
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330-31 (1985).
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to spare a defendant from execution, and that discretion contem-
plates acts of mercy, it is not only anomalous, but also impossible,
for reviewing courts to undertake the rational inquiry outlined by
Chapman.90
Finally, even if the reviewing court were able to predict the
effect of the error with regard to a particular aggravating or miti-
gating factor, it still would not be able to carry out the harmless
error test. The state (or the defendant, if the error is nonconstitu-
tional) must show that the aggravating evidence outweighs the
mitigating evidence."1 But it is the sentencer that decides how
much weight to give to the aggravating and mitigating factors, and
that decision is not amenable to appellate review. Because the sen-
tencer may-indeed, must-consider all factors in whatever bal-
ance it chooses in deciding upon the sentence, the appellate court
cannot determine either beyond a reasonable doubt or with a rea-
sonable certainty what impact the aggravating or mitigating factor
would have had on the decision.
Thus, the sentencer's discretion and its ability to impose
mercy make it impossible for a reviewing court to weed out "harm-
less" error in capital sentencing proceedings. The reviewing court
is simply unable to assess the impact of any error on the sen-
tencer-both because of uncertainty over the error's place in the
sentencer's deliberations and because of the sentencer's ability to
impose life imprisonment instead of death whenever it chooses.
When there is error, therefore, death sentences must be reversed.
The premise of the harmless error doctrine is that the impact of
errors on trial and sentencing courts can be assessed by appellate
courts. Where this assessment is impossible, the doctrine should
not apply.
This assessment is not based on a judgment that the death
penalty is illegitimate. The defendant in a capital sentencing pro-
ceeding has no right to a particular outcome any more than a de-
fendant in any other criminal proceeding. But he certainly has a
"legitimate interest in the character of the procedure which leads
91 See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330, quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality):
"Whatever intangibles a jury might consider in its sentencing determination, few can be
gleaned from an appellate record. This inability to confront and examine the individuality
of the defendant would be particularly devastating to any attempt for consideration of what
this Court has termed '[those] compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the di-
verse frailties of humankind.'" Consider also McCleskey, 107 S.Ct. at 1767 ("Each jury is
unique in its composition, and the Constitution requires that its decision rest on considera-
tion of innumerable factors.").
0' See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 52.
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to the imposition of sentence.""2
Harmless error analysis in capital sentencing is inappropriate
for nonconstitutional errors as well as constitutional ones. Ordina-
rily, the Court refuses to require automatic reversal for nonconsti-
tutional errors,9s but its reluctance to do so must, again, depend on
its confidence in the courts' ability to ferret out errors that influ-
enced the trial outcome.
Moreover, any error in capital sentencing implicates some con-
stitutional concerns. The constitutionally compelled sentencing
discretion in capital punishment proceedings may be undermined
by error regardless of whether an independent constitutional right
is violated. For example, consider a case in which a piece of miti-
gating evidence is excluded under an erroneous construction of a
state's rules of evidence. Although this mistake does not itself vio-
late the defendant's constitutional rights, it constricts the defend-
ant's constitutionally required opportunity for mitigation and
mercy. Since the sentencer may not impose the death penalty if it
finds even one mitigating factor, it must follow that the erroneous
exclusion of just one piece of mitigating evidence necessitates re-
sentencing. As the Supreme Court has time and again stressed, the
stakes are extraordinarily high in such cases-too high to risk
error.
The above conclusions contain their own limiting principle, il-
lustrated by the following syllogism. Error in capital sentencing
proceedings is constitutionally troublesome only when an appellate
court cannot assess the impact of the error on the sentencer. To
assess the impact of an error on the sentencer, the appellate court
must put itself in the shoes of the sentencer. The appellate court is
unable to do so only when the character of the proceedings below
would have been different if the error had not occurred-or, in
other words, when the error affects the balance of factors that the
sentencer must consider. Evidentiary errors change the character
of proceedings by altering the menu of proof. Structural errors do
not change the character of the proceedings themselves because, by
definition, they are mistakes that occur on the perimeter of the
conduct of the litigation.
Thus, while the appellate court is able to assess the impact of
structural errors, it is unable to assess the impact of evidentiary
errors on the sentencer. The harmless error doctrine therefore may
be applied to the former but not to the latter in capital sentencing
:2 See Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358 (Stevens, concurring).
" See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65.
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proceedings. This limitation ensures that the costs associated with
automatic reversal-such as the use of scarce judicial re-
sources-will not be too great. In any event, constitutional inter-
ests may not be sacrificed in order to spare society such costs.
CONCLUSION
A per se rule requiring automatic reversal once evidentiary er-
ror in capital sentencing proceedings is found win bring additional
safeguards to capital sentencing without seriously affecting the
harmless error concerns of judicial economy and justice. Errors
that affect the evidence presented to the sentencer present a pow-
erful case for application of a rule of absolute reversal. Because of
the inability of the reviewing court to determine the impact of
such errors on the sentencer, the Chapman test should not be used
to determine the harmlessness of error in capital sentencing.
James C. Scoville
